


Questions about Hard Determinism

- Hard determinism denies that we are free and says that if we are determined then we lack the freedom to be morally responsible



Does Theism Imply Determinism?

- Assume there is a God and when God created the world God knew all the choices you (and others) were going to make.
- If God had wanted each of us to make a different set of choices (to do things differently than what we did), then God would have created the world differently
- Hence, you and your choices are a product of God's creation
- Hence, you and your actions are determined by God
- Hence, under this conception of God you are not free

Objections to Hard Determinism, I

- *"I feel that I am free"*
- HD would respond that you are simply ignorant of the many (invisible) causes determining your actions
- *"I could always make a different choice than what I did make"*
- HD would understand what you are saying to be that if you had wanted to, you could have chosen otherwise. But, then the HD would say that admitting that you could have chosen otherwise if you had wanted to simply means that if your psychological state had been different, then so would your choice.

Objections to Hard Determinism, II

- *"Sometimes I have to deliberate to make a decision"*
- HD would say that deliberation results when there are equally compelling but conflicting causes for acting
- *"It's impossible to predict our own or another's behavior"*
- HD might agree that in practice it is impossible, in principle it is possible to predict behavior

Suppose...

- Suppose you are a waiter in a restaurant and you spilled a drink on a hard determinist.
- Would it make a difference to him whether you did it voluntarily (you meant to soil his clothes) or whether you did it involuntarily (you were jostled by another waiter)?
- Despite our theory of human behavior, don't we all make a distinction between actions done voluntarily or involuntarily?
- Is it possible to deal with human interactions without the category of moral responsibility?

Compatibilism

Compatibilism

- We are determined **and** we have moral responsibility
- Circumstantial freedom is all we need to be morally responsible
 - Compatibilism attempts to avoid the severe consequences of Hard Determinism
 - Compatibilism is often called Soft Determinism
- **Compatibilism** says determinism is compatible with moral responsibility
- **Incompatibilism** says determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility

Compatibilism Agrees We Live in a Causally Determined World

- Compatibilism agrees we live in a causally determined world
- The Compatibilist and the Hard Determinist agree that our actions are completely determined
- However, the Compatibilist does not think the consequences of complete causal determination are as harsh (hard) as the Hard Determinist thinks

How is Being Determined Compatible with Being Free?

- Compatibilist argues for freedom by arguing for a particular conception of freedom
 - Free actions are those that are done voluntarily
- What is a voluntary action?

Stace

The Problem of Free Will

Are Humans Morally Responsible?

- If morality is concerned with what humans ought or ought not to do, then what happens if humans act under compulsion?
- Could humans really be said to be morally responsible?

Is the Question About Our Actions Being Determined Really a Verbal Dispute?

- Suppose that the definition of human were "a five-legged animal"
- Looking around the world we find no five-legged animals. Should we conclude that there is no such thing as a human?
- By the same token, the reason we do not find "free will" is because we have incorrectly defined it.

How was Free Will Defined?

- Free will used to be defined as "indeterminism" (e.g., Holbach)
- But, look around the world and you won't find anything that is not wholly determined by causes or predictable beforehand
- Given this definition, it's no surprise that there is no free will to be found

What Makes for a Correct Definition?

- A correct definition is one which conforms to common usage
- One can define human as a five-legged creature, but this is not what is commonly referred to as a human
- Likewise, we can define free will as indeterminism. But, if that is not what is commonly meant when the term is used, then what is?

How is Free Will Defined in the Imaginary Cases?

- What's the difference between the pairs of imaginary cases?
 - Are any of the acts uncaused?
 - What distinguishes the contrasting cases of each pair?
- In the "Murder in Trenton" case and the discussion with the philosopher,
 - What does the philosopher say is irrelevant to the case?
 - Why are the philosopher's comments absurd?

What Is Common to All Free Acts?

- Is it the case that all free acts are uncaused? Are any of them not determined by some causes?
 - All free and unfree acts have causes. So, what distinguished free from unfree is not a causal property
- If all acts have causes, what is the difference between free and unfree causes?
 - The free acts are caused by desires, motives, or some sort of psychological state
 - The unfree acts are caused by forces outside of the agent

Free Will as Psychological Causes

- "Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent."
 - If one defines free will like this, does it exist?
- "Acts not freely done are those whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent."
 - Unfree acts are "out of our control"

Problem "Borderline" Cases

- Stace's definition does not fit all cases
- Consider the thug who threatens to shoot you unless give up your wallet
 - In giving up your wallet, have you acted of your own free will, or not?
 - According to Stace's definition you acted freely because your act was motivated by some inner psychological state
 - But, most would argue that you did not act freely
- Stace thinks this is a border line case where the presence of the gun approximates force and is one of compulsion

Is One Morally Responsible?

- Since Stace assumes that all of our actions are causally determined, how can one be morally responsible?
- Can we justify punishment even if all actions are causally determined?
 - Punishment is justified on the grounds that it will (i) correct the wrong doer's character or that (ii) it will deter others from acting similarly
- If determinism is true, how can punishment correct behavior?

Punishment Provides the Missing Motive

- Punishment provides the missing motive to correct and deter behavior
 - What is this missing motive?
 - the fear of future pain if he repeats the wrong behavior
- Punishment is an "artificially injected motive"

Moral Responsibility Requires Causal Determinism

1. If punishment is to be effective, then it must correct behavior
2. Punishment is effective.
3. Punishment corrects behavior.
4. If human actions and volitions were uncaused, it would be useless either to punish or reward or to attempt to correct people's bad behavior.
5. Thus, human actions and volitions are caused.
6. If moral responsibility did not require causal determinism, then humans actions and volitions would not be caused.

7. Moral responsibility requires causal determinism.